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STUDENT NOTES

because the law is "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious";" that the
means selected do not have a "real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained";0 that the law passed does not have a
"reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose"; ®' or, that the lawmaking body is not acting "within its sphere of government".
Great stress is placed upon the economic factors involved, the real
theme of the court appearing to be that when the theory of free
economic competition has failed in a particular industry of vital importance to the public, by virtue of the importance of that industry to
the public it is subject to regulation as a business owing the "public
service" previously restricted to public utilities. In any such situation
the court holds the power of final decision, and will pass upon the
propriety of the intended control. In this field the court is essentially
engaged in reading into the economic theory of the day the credo of the
time, which by its natilre is subject to the vagaries of contemporary
theory. For these reasons it seems that the personnel of the court and
the social concepts of the day are the prime factors in predicting the
trend of future decisions. As the occasion for such regulation infrequently arises, it is to be doubted that the leanings of the court in any
particular case, or series of cases, will prove binding upon subsequent
opinions.
JOHN B. BRcINRMGE.

CRIMINAL LAW-THE STANDARD OF CARE IN CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-MANSLAUGHTER.
The problem with which we are confronted here is to distinguish
and develop that criterion which might be recommended to the courts
for determining what degree of care is necessary in order for one to be
exempt from criminal punishment after having committed a negligent
act which has been the direct cause of death to another.
There are two leading theories which tend to define such a standard,
and, though other theories may be worth consideration, we shall deal
only with these two since this is a practical problem which must be
dealt with without indulging in theoretical gestures which have no
practical significance today. The first, and that which is generally
recognized and used as the standard in the majority of the jurisdictions
today, is the theory that criminal negligence can be imputed only to
that conduct which denotes an "utter disregard for the lives and safety
of others".' This may be termed the gross negligence theory. The
second theory, and one which has gained a foothold in our judicial
system, is the principle that "that degree of care must have been exercised which an ordinary prudent man would have exercised under like
circumstances". 2 This latter is the tort theory of negligence applied
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to criminal law, and we shall term it the ordinary negligence theory.
Our problem is to determine which of these two theories is better
qualified to be the criterion in the determination of a standard of care
In criminal negligence.
F irst, let us consider the inconsistency In punishing a negligent
act as a crime. Crime, by definition, signifies that the commission of
the act must have been intentional. An act committed through
negligence is certainly not intentional in the strict sense of the word.
Thus it is difficult to reconcile punishment for such acts to the postulate
of guilt established by the definition of Crime. However, the gross
negligence theory can be reconciled to this definition since it rests on
the assumption that the prisoner did know of the results of his acts,
but was recklessly or wantonly indifferent to these results.' It can
readily be seen how this assumption might be used as a direct substitute for actual intent. If one actually knows the consequences of
his acts it can be assumed that if he then commits such acts he actually
intended the results which must follow. But if one merely ought to
have known the results of his acts, and there is no assumption that he
actually did know (the basis of the ordinary negligence theory),3 how
can actual intent to reach the injurious results be predicated from such
act? It is extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, to make
ordinary negligence commensurate with our accepted conception of
crime. Criminal negligence is, in essence, a substitute for criminal
intent, and, in order for there to be such a substitution, the negligence
must be something more than mere failure to exercise ordinary care.
In Robertson v. State' the defendant, in sport and without criminal
design, aimed a pistol at another, both supposing it to be unloaded, and
the defendant pulled the trigger, whereby the pistol was discharged
and the other was killed. Held: Not guilty, since an action accompanied not only with no intent to do harm but under a reasonable belief
that no harm is possible, is clearly wanting in every essential element
of crime. But if this set of facts were applied under the ordinary
negligence theory, there seems to be little doubt that there would have
been a conviction, since it is true that a man of ordinary prudence
would not have aimed such a dangerous instrument at another even in
sport. But should a man be subjected to severe punishment for a
crime when he merely fails to exercise a l the prudence that is necessary under the circumstances? It would be decidedly unfair and unjust
to answer in the affirmative. The only apparent reason why such a
slight degree of negligence should be punished would be to serve to
deter such negligence. But, though criminal punishment may perhaps
have this effect upon negligence of that degree which might be termed
"gross" or which might serve as a direct substitute for actual intent, it
894 (1930); State v.
1 State v. Melton, 226 Mo. 962, 33 S. W. (2d)
Millin, 318 Mo. 553, 300 S. W. 694 (1927).
2
Bailum v. State, 17 Ala. 679, 88 So. 200 (1921); State v. Beckham,
306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817 (1924).
:People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N. W. 97 (1927).
'2 Lea (Tenn.) 239, 31 Am. Rep. 602 (1879).
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must readily be seen that criminal punishment does not often deter
ordinary negligence, since ordinary negligence, as the term would imply,
may be considered one of the frailties of human nature which is possessed by the ordinary individual to some extent and, consequently,
oould not possibly be eliminated by purely deterrent means. Thus the
only reason supporting criminal punishment for ordinary negligence
would seem to be groundless.
Negligence, to become criminal, must necessarily be reckless, or
wanton and of such a character as to show an utter disregard for the
safety of others, under circumstances likely to cause injury. In predIcating criminal liability upon acts caused by ordinary negligence it
is not essential that the circumstances were likely to have caused
injury. It is sufficient in case of ordinary negligence that the circumstances did cause injury and that the defendant was the major factor in
the promotion of such circumstances. For instance, in Robertson v.
State' both the prisoner and the deceased were satisfied that the
weapon was not loaded, and were assured of that fact by a third person. But it must be admitted that the defendant used less care than a
man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances would have used,
since such a man, it may be presumed, would not have used such a
weapon under those circumstances for purposes of making sport. But
can we say that he promoted circumstances which were likely to cause
Injury? I think not. The weapon was not used under circumstances
which were likely to cause injury, or even from which an injury should
have been foreseen. Then, how could criminal intent be predicated
from such a slightly negligent act? It could not! Criminal liability
cannot be predicated upon every act carelessly performed merely beck"use such carelessness results in the death of another.
It Is the general rule, implied or express, in many jurisdictions
that the degree of care required in the handling of instrumentalities
is in more or less direct proportion to the degree of danger that will
probably be caused.' The use of a dangerous agency requires the care
commensurate with the nature and uses of the agency and the conditions and circumstances under which it is operated or utilized.
The
rule that gross negligence must be shown does not mean that the same
negligence must appear in each case, but each case must be determined
on its merits. These merits depend to a large extent upon the dangerousness of the instrumentalities used. Though the careless use of a
dangerous article or instrument in ignorance, or with a laudable purpose, is net necessarily unlawful,8 the degree of care required of the
Individual with the dangerous instrument is considerably greater than
that required for the use of an instrument which is not recognized as
dangerous. In State v. Hardie,* for example, the defendant, in the
5People v. Sikes, 328 Ill. 64, 159 N. E. 293 (1927).
'Robertson v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 239, 31 Am. Rep. 602 (1879).
" Carter v. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 83 Fla. 470, 91 So. 893 (1922).
8
Ann v. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 159 (1850).
' State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa 647, 29 Am. Rep. 496 (1878).
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spirit of fun or joke, pointed an old revolver containing a bullet, which
he had many times previously attempted to discharge and which he
therefore considered harmless, at deceased and snapped the trigger
whereby it was discharged with resultant death to deceased. The
court held the defendant guilty of manslaughter on the ground that
when one commits an act which a man of ordinary prudence would not
commit he should be held liable for the consequences of his act; In
other words, the court used the ordinary negligence theory of criminal
negligence. This decision is, in my opinion, correct, though reconciliation with the majority rule would be difficult in its accomplishment.
I would base my opinion entirely upon the theory that a reckless and
imprudent act, though not grossly negligent in itself, is justly censurable when committed in connection with so dangerous an instrumentalIty as a revolver which is known to have a bullet in it, regardless of a
number of attempts previously made to discharge this bullet. The
dangerousness of the instrumentality has been used by the courts in
connection with the gross negligence theory to reduce the latter high
standard to include just such cases as State v. Hardie, in order that
justice might be done. I would suggest that the court include in its
instructions in the future that the dangerousness of the agency or
instrumentality be taken into consideration in determining whether
sufficient care was used.
In conclusion and by way of summary, I would recommend that
of the two practical theories under consideration, the majority rule Is
better qualified to be the criterion in the determination of a standard
of care in criminal negligence: First, because the punishing of ordinary negligence is naturally inconsistent with our conception of Crime;
Secondly, because the deterrent effect is more effective upon gross
negligence than it is upon ordinary negligence due to the natural frailties of human nature; and Thirdly, because the theory of ordinary
negligence cannot be reconciled to the reasonable theory that negligence, to become criminal, must be the result of circumstances likely
to cause injury. But I do not recommend that the majority rule be
accepted unqualifiedly. I would suggest that the element of the dangerous agency be taken into consideration by the courts in their instructions, because I am unwilling to leave so important an element as
merely one of the "circumstances" of the case. A general instruction
for the determination of the standard of care in criminal negligence,
limited to manslaughter, might be framed as follows: Gentlemen of
the Jury: If you believe that the negligence of the defendant under
the circumstances was such as to be wanton and reckless to that degree
which would indicate an utter disregard for the lives and safety of
others, taking Into consideration the apparent dangerousness of the
instrumentality used at the time of the occurrence, you will be justified
in finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
J. WmT TuRNmE, JR.

